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For Programme Operators

Data Handling and Confidentiality

A foundation handing over grantee data will ask how it is handled before it signs anything. This page answers that for an institutional reader, including the parts where the honest answer is that a control is not built yet.

Pursuing DFSA Innovation Testing Licence · DIFC, Dubai

Current Status, Stated Plainly

  • FounderGrade is pre-launch. There is no production backend holding programme or grantee data today, and no programme data has been processed.
  • We hold no security certification. We do not claim SOC 2, ISO 27001, or any equivalent, and no third-party security audit has been completed. When one is, the report reference will be published on this page with its date.
  • We are pursuing a DFSA Innovation Testing Licence in DIFC, Dubai and are not currently licensed or regulated by the DFSA.
  • Everything below the status section is stated as a commitment: the control we will operate at launch. Where a control is not yet built, it says so.

The Data

What Is Provided, and Who Can See It

Three sources, three different visibility rules. The rule that matters most: raw grantee evidence does not flow to the programme by default, because the programme asked for a finding, not a document dump.

Provided by the Programme

  • Programme and cohort structure, tranche schedules and award amounts
  • Milestone definitions and the evidence expected for each
  • Grantee identities and contact details for the cohort in scope
  • Named programme staff and their access level

Who can see it: Visible to programme staff you authorise, to FounderGrade operations staff on a need basis, and to the assigned verifier only in the reduced form needed to run the check.

Provided by the Grantee

  • Evidence submitted against a milestone: repositories, exports, contracts, confirmations
  • Commercial and personal information incidental to that evidence
  • Written responses to verifier evidence requests

Who can see it: Visible to the assigned verifier and to the grantee. Released to the programme in the form the milestone definition agreed, which is usually the finding and the reasons rather than the raw material.

Produced by FounderGrade

  • The finding: Corroborated, Contradicted or Unable To Verify
  • The written reasons and the evidence categories relied on
  • Verifier identity, tier and signed conflict declaration
  • The audit trail of every action taken on the record

Who can see it: Visible to the programme and the verified party. Published only where the programme chooses to publish.

Controls

Commitments, and Where Each One Stands

Each control states what we commit to operate, then states honestly what exists today. Nothing here is presented as certified or audited.

Access Control

Role-scoped access with least privilege, per programme and per engagement. Programme staff see their own programme only. Verifiers see only the engagements assigned to them.

Current status: Role model implemented in the prototype. Enforcement moves server side at launch.

Confidentiality of Evidence

Grantee evidence is never published, never anchored to a public record and never shared with other programmes. Only a cryptographic digest of the written reasons is ever made public.

Current status: Designed and documented. No production storage exists yet.

Retention and Deletion

Evidence is retained for the engagement plus 24 months, then deleted. Findings and audit entries are retained permanently because a verification record that can be deleted is not a record. Personal data inside evidence is deleted on request where no legal retention obligation applies.

Current status: Policy set. Automated retention jobs are a launch deliverable.

Export and Portability

Programmes export every finding, reason, audit entry and milestone mapping as structured data at any time, including on exit. Grantees export their own findings. Export is not gated behind a plan tier or a notice period.

Current status: Export implemented in the console as an illustrative preview only.

Sub-Processors

A public sub-processor list with the purpose and region of each, and 30 days notice before a new one is added, so a programme can object before it takes effect.

Current status: The list will be published at launch. No sub-processor is engaged today because no data is processed.

Audit Trail

Every action on a verification record writes an immutable entry: who requested evidence, who submitted it, who verified, what the finding was, who appealed and what changed. Programmes read their own trail directly and export it.

Current status: Visible in the programme console today against illustrative sample records.

Independence Has a Confidentiality Cost, and We Pay It.

A verifier needs enough grantee material to reach a finding, and no more. The programme needs enough of the finding to make a release decision, and no more. Neither of those is served by moving every document to every party, so we do not.

Blind Review and Conflicts

How We Keep a Verifier Unconflicted with Your Grantee

These rules are part of the published verification standard, restated here because a programme will ask about them during procurement rather than during onboarding.

Who Verifies

A calibrated expert drawn from the verification pool, matched by sector and by the milestone type under review. Verifiers are named to the programme and to the grantee, and their calibration status is on the record.

Independent of the Grantee

A verifier is disqualified where they hold or have held equity, tokens, debt or an advisory position in the grantee, have worked for or with the grantee inside the last 24 months, are related to a founder or officer, or have an open commercial discussion with the grantee.

Independent of the Programme

A verifier is disqualified where they sit on the programme's selection committee, council or board, where they authored the grant application, or where their compensation varies with the outcome of the finding. Verifier pay is fixed by tier and is identical whatever the finding is.

Blind Where Blindness Is Possible

Assessment review is blind to grantee identity where the evidence permits it. Milestone verification frequently cannot be blind, because confirming a deployment or a counterparty requires identity. Where blindness is not possible we say so on the finding rather than pretend otherwise.

Declaration and Recusal

Every verifier signs a conflict declaration per engagement. Any conflict discovered mid-engagement triggers immediate recusal, the finding is voided and the milestone is reassigned at our cost.

Read the Full Standard

The Record and Attestation Model

Attestation-based record keeping is an established pattern in grant tooling, so programme operators reasonably ask how a verification is anchored. Here is exactly what is recorded, what is public, what never leaves the platform, and how a third party checks a finding without asking us.

That a verification engagement was opened

Anchored · Public

A milestone identifier, the programme identifier and a timestamp. No evidence and no narrative.

The finding: Corroborated, Contradicted or Unable To Verify

Anchored · Public

The outcome, the standard version applied, the verifier tier and a timestamp.

A cryptographic digest of the written reasons

Anchored · Public

A hash only. Anyone holding the reasons document can confirm it is the one that was recorded, and nobody can read it from the hash.

The written reasons themselves

Off Chain · Programme and Parties

Held in the platform record, released to the programme and the verified party, and exportable by both.

The evidence the grantee submitted

Off Chain · Parties Only

Never anchored, never published. Confidential material stays confidential by design, not by policy alone.

Verifier identity

Off Chain · Programme and Parties

Disclosed to the programme and the grantee for conflict checking. The public record carries the tier and calibration status, not a name.

Appeals and overturned findings

Anchored · Public

An overturn is recorded as a new entry referencing the original. Nothing is deleted or rewritten.

How a Third Party Confirms a Verification Happened

  1. 1Take the milestone identifier from the programme's own record or from the finding document.
  2. 2Resolve it against the published record to see whether an engagement was opened and what the outcome was.
  3. 3Hash the reasons document you were given and compare it to the digest on the record. A match proves the document is the one that was recorded and has not been altered.
  4. 4Where the programme publishes a transparency page, the same identifiers appear there, so a community member can perform the same check without our help.

The Network Is Not Yet Chosen, and We Will Not Pretend Otherwise

  • The specific EVM-compatible network has not been selected. We will not name one before the decision is made, because naming a network we have not committed to would be misleading.
  • No contracts are deployed today. The platform is pre-launch and nothing described here is running in production.
  • Contract addresses, the network choice and the record schema will be published at launch, on this page, before any production record is written.
  • The record model is deliberately portable: identifiers, outcomes and digests, with no dependency on any single network's features. If the network choice changes, historic digests can be re-anchored on the new network with the original timestamps retained off chain and the migration published.
  • Anchoring is a durability and tamper-evidence mechanism. It is not what makes a finding credible. The verifier's independence and the published standard are what make a finding credible.

The rules a finding is produced under are published in the verification standard, and the division of labour between tooling and people is published in the methodology.

Incident Notification

  • A confirmed incident affecting programme or grantee data is notified to the affected programme without undue delay and within 72 hours of confirmation, with what we know at the time rather than a polished statement later.
  • Notification includes the data categories affected, the engagements affected and the containment action taken.
  • We publish a post-incident write-up once the matter is closed.
  • This is a commitment for launch. We have had no incident because we hold no production data.

Procurement questions, a security questionnaire or a data processing agreement draft go to security@foundergrade.ai. See also the privacy policy, terms and trust and security.

For Programmes

Send This to Your Counsel, Then Talk to Us.

Every commitment on this page applies to a pilot from the day the scope is signed.

Pursuing DFSA Innovation Testing Licence · DIFC, Dubai